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INTRODUCTION

HE majority of sellers of single family residences employ licensed real estate brokers' to find suitable buyers for their

t Associate Professor, College and Graduate School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin. B.A., Baylor University; J.D., University of Texas at

Austin.
1. For the purpose of this article, a real estate broker, salesman or licensee
will be referred to as a "broker." A real estate broker is defined as:

(939)
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properties. In the typical transaction, the broker and the seller 3
have entered into a written agreement of employment-a listing
contract, 4 which creates an agency relationship between the seller
[A] a person who, for another person and for a fee, commission, or
other valuable consideration, or with the intention or in the expectation
or on the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, commission, or other
valuable consideration from another person
(A) sells, exchanges, purchases, rents, or leases real estate;
(B) offers to sell, exchange, purchase, rent, or lease real estate;
(C) negotiates or attempts to negotiate the listing, sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or leasing of real estate;
(D) lists or offers or attempts or agrees to list real estate for sale,
rental, lease, exchange, or trade;
(E) appraises or offers or attempts or agrees to appraise real
estate;
(F) auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees to auction, real
estate;
(G) buys or sells or offers to buy or sell, or otherwise deals in
options on real estate;
(H) aids, attempts, or offers to aid in locating or obtaining for
purchase, rent, or lease any real estate;
(I) procures or assists in the procuring of prospects for the purpose of effecting the sale, exchange, lease, or rental of real estate;
or
(J) procures or assists in the procuring of properties for the purpose of effecting the sale, exchange, lease or rental of real estate.
Id. § 2(2).
A real estate salesman is defined as: "a person associated with a Texas licensed real estate broker for the purposes of performing acts or transactions
comprehended by the definition of 'real estate broker' as defined in this Act."
Id..
2. Approximately 81% of single family home sellers employ the services of
a broker. Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, "Residential Real Estate
Brokerage Industry," Consumer Survey, 8 (Figure I-1), (Gov't Print, Dec. 1983
(Stock 018-000-00305-8) [hereinafter FTC report].
3. Nothing prohibits the buyer from employing a broker to find suitable
property for purchase. The buyer and broker enter into a contractual agreement whereby the buyer agrees to compensate the broker when a suitable property is found by the broker. This arrangement is unusual in the typical
residential transaction because the buyer will not have the cash available to pay
the broker's fee. However, in many commercial transactions the buyer will be
represented by a broker. For further discussion on the buyer-broker relationship, see infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Real Estate
Brokers Liability for Failure to Disclose: A New Dutv to Investigate, 17 PAc. L.J. 327,
328-29 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Real Estate Brokers Liability for Failure to
Disclose].
4. There are three basic types of listing contracts: a) the open listing: the
broker will be entitled to the commission if she is the procuring cause of the
buyer; the owner retains the right to sell the property himself or to hire other
brokers to sell the property; b) the exclusive agency listing contract: only one
broker may be employed to sell the property under this contract, however, the
owner retains the right to sell the property without compensating the listing
broker; and c) the exclusive right to sell listing contract: the listing broker will
receive the commission if the property is sold during the listing period regardless of who actually sells the property. 7 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY
938.16[2][a], [c] & [d] (1984).
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and the broker. 5 A fiduciary relationship exists between the
seller, as principal, and the broker, as agent. 6 The broker's duty
7
to the seller is very similar to a trustee's duty to a beneficiary:
the broker is required to act with utmost good faith toward the
seller. 8 This duty is well recognized at common law and by statute in many states. 9 While the broker's duty to the seller-principal is clearly recognized, there are increasing numbers of court
decisions which recognize a legal duty that the broker owes to the
buyer. 10
The *exactnature of the duty the broker employed by a seller
owes to a buyer varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Most
courts hold that a broker will be liable for an intentional misrepresentation made to the purchaser of real property.'' A number
5. 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 25 (1985) (describing such agency relationship as ordinarily special one).
6. Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties: An Examination of Current Industry Standards and Practices, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 145, 150 n.22 (1984)
("Agency is a fiduciary relationship between two persons, resulting from the
consensual delegation from one to another to act on his behalf and [usually] to
exercise some degree of discretion while acting) (citing Skopp v. Wenver, 16
Cal. 3d 432, 439, 546 P.2d 307, 312, 128 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (1976)) [hereinafter
Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties].
7. See, e.g., Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 674, 441 P.2d 101, 109-10,
68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 597-98 (1968); see also Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6, at 150.
8. M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish, 34 Colo. App. 320, 322, 527 P.2d 912, 914 (1974)
("Under both the common law and applicable statutes, a real estate agent, in all
dealings affecting the subject matter of his agency, has a fiduciary duty to act
with the utmost faith and loyalty in behalf of his principal.") (citing McKinney v.
Christmas, 143 Colo. 361, 363, P.2d 373, 374 (1960); Treat v. Schmidt, 69 Colo.
190, 191, 193 P. 666, 667 (1920); COLO. REV. STAT. § 117-1-12 (1963)). For a
more detailed discussion of this good faith requirement, see infra notes 20-41
and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2228 (West 1985).
10. See, e.g., Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1975) (broker under
fiduciary duty to deal fairly with buyer and that duty was breached when broker
outbid buyer for property); Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 761-63 (Alaska
1982) (buyer has cause of action against broker for innocent misrepresentation
communicated by broker); Easton v. Strassburger. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199
Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984) (broker has affirmative duty to investigate property
and disclose material defects to buyer); Zichlin v. Dill, 25 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1946)
(broker owes duty to buyer to deal fairly and ethically); Miles v. McSwegin, 58
Ohio St. 2d 97, 101. 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1369-70 (1979) (broker owed duty to
buyer to correct representations concerning condition of property); Wegg v.
Henry Broaderick, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 589, 592-931, 557 P.2d 861, 863-64
(1976) (broker held liable to buyer for failure to advise buyer of seller's remedies under land sale contract in event of buyer's default).
11. See Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727
(1976). The court in Cooper stated:
It is the law of this state [California] that where a real estate broker or
agent, representing the seller, knows facts materially affecting the value
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of courts have expanded this duty of a broker to include liability
for negligent' 2 as well as innocent' 3 misrepresentation. Other
courts have found liability of a broker to a buyer based on a negligence cause of action. 14 Some courts have foregone traditional
tort remedies as bases for the legal duty a broker owes a buyer
and have found that a fiduciary duty exists between broker and
buyer who are not in a written contractual relationship. 15 In
some cases the courts have found that an agency relationship exists between buyer and broker which gives rise to a fiduciary
duty.'

6

However, the uncertainty of the exact nature of this rela-

or the desirability of property offered for sale and these facts are known
or accessible only to him and his principal, and the broker or agent also
knows that these facts are not known to or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the broker or agent is
under a duty to disclose these facts to the buyer.
Id. (citing Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201,
204 (1963); Annotation, Liability of Vendor's Real-Estate Broker or Agent to Purchaser
for Misrepresentations as to, or Nondisclosure of Physical Defects of Property Sold, 8
A.L.R.3d 537 (1966)); see also Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 2d 261, 266-67, 193
Cal. Rptr. 130, 132-33 (1983) (broker liable to buyer for his knowing failure to
disclose murders of woman and four children that took place ten years earlier in
home that buyer purchased); Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 18, 22, 113 A.2d
136, 138 (1955) ("Jere [broker] was not the agent of the plaintiff [buyer]. Nevertheless, he could not deliberately deceive him.").
12. Provost v. Miller, 473 A.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Vt. 1984) (broker guilty of
negligent misrepresentation only if he passes on information from seller which
he knows or has reason to know is untrue); First Church of the Open Bible v.
Cline J. Dunton Realty, Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 281, 574 P.2d 1211, 1215
(1978) (broker liable for negligently misrepresenting boundary lines to
purchaser).
13. Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982) (buyer who relies on
material misrepresentation of broker, notwithstanding innocently made, has
cause of action); Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82, 83-84 (D.C. 1954) (broker
liable to buyer for innocently misrepresenting that house could be heated for "a
little over $100 a year," when defect in heater made it impossible to heat house
at all).
14. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383,
390 (1984). The court stated:
However, in cases where, as here, the cause of action is for negligence,
not fraud, it need not be alleged or proved that the broker had actual
knowledge of the material facts in issue nor that such facts were accessible only to him or his principal and that he therefore had constructive
knowledge thereof.
Id.
15. Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1975) (broker has fiduciary duty
to deal fairly and honestly with prospective purchasers); Fairfield Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Kroll, 106 Il1. App. 2d 296, 303-05, 246 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (1969)
(broker who undertook to obtain financing for confused buyer, became agent of
buyer and stood in fiduciary relationship with her).
16. See Lerk v. McCabe, 349 Il1. 348, 360-61, 182 N.E. 388. 393 (1932) (defendant-bank officer held to be voluntary agent of plaintiff for purpose of buying
real estate); Fairfield Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kroll, 106 Ill. App. 2d 296, 363-05.
246 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (1969) (broker who voluntarily undertook to obtain fi-
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tionship has led to a certain confusion in the real estate industry.' 7

The broker is understandably bewildered by the legal

morass in which he is floundering. On one hand, the broker is
the agent of the seller and owes a fiduciary duty to that seller. On
the other, the broker is aware that he has some sort of duty to the
buyer and that duty seems to be broadening. The broker needs
guidance as to the precise nature and extent of his duty to prospective purchasers of real property.
This article will analyze the various types of legal duties to a
buyer that courts have imposed on the real estate broker. General agency concepts and fiduciary duties applicable to brokers,
sellers and purchasers will first be discussed. The various types of
tort liability that give rise to a duty to the purchaser of real property will then be discussed. Finally the article will indorse a legal
analysis which characterizes the broker's duty to the buyer in
terms of liability for negligence rather than that of a fiduciary
relationship.
The broker owes a duty to the buyer to act reasonably, ethically and honestly in all his dealings with the buyer. This duty, as
stated by the California Court of Appeals for the First District in
Easton v. Strassburger,18 requires that the broker "conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential
property listed for sale and ...

disclose to prospective purchasers

all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an investigation would reveal."' 19
20
The recognition of this duty by courts, and legislatures
across the country will not only provide much needed protection
for purchasers of residential real estate, but also protect the broker. from any further expansion of liability. If the broker is required to conduct a reasonable inspection of the property, the
nancing for confused buyer stood in fiduciary relationship); Spindler v. Krieger,
16 Ill. App. 2d 131, 144-46, 147 N.E.2d 457, 463-65 (1958) (broker found to be
agent of buyer where buyer informed broker that he wanted to buy particular
piece of land in Peoria, Illinois).
17. Hanna & Richardson, Whom Do You Represent? Knowing Your Principal:
Accidental Agency in a Nutshell, Tex. Realtor, Feb. 1986, at 6 [hereinafter Hanna &
Richardson].
18. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
19. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (footnote omitted).
20. The California legislature, in direct response to Easton, enacted California Civil Code § 2079 (West Supp. 1988) and California Civil Code § 1102
(West Supp. 1988), in an attempt to define the nature and extent of the inspection and disclosure requirements of real estate brokers. Section 2079 codifies
the inspection and disclosure duties of the broker and section 1102 involves the
implementation of the disclosure and investigation duties.
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broker can protect himself from seller misinformation and prospective purchasers are much more likely to receive material factual information concerning the property. This duty will

ultimately lead to fewer lawsuits being filed against the broker by
disgruntled buyers.
II.

AGENCY LAW AND THE REAL ESTATE BROKER

A.

1.

The Broker's Duty to the Seller

The Fiduciary Duties

In the usual residential transaction, the seller and the broker
are in an agency relationship. 2 ' This relationship is created by
the execution of the listing contract.2 2 In the listing contract the
broker agrees to use his best efforts to find a buyer for the property and the seller promises to pay an agreed commission to the

broker if the property sells within the listing period. 23 The broker, as a result of the agency relationship, owes certain duties to
the principal; among them, the duties of honesty,2 4 loyalty,2 5 and

full disclosure to the principal of all material facts concerning the
transaction. 26 As a general notion, the broker must act in the best
21. Nordstrom v. Miller, 227 Kan. 59, 63, 605 P.2d 545, 551 (1980) (citing
Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 683, 594 P.2d 650, 656 (1979)); Marcotte
Realty & Auction Inc. v. Schumacher, 225 Kan. 193, 589 P.2d 570 (1979);
Hanna & Richardson, supra note 7; Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary
Duties, supra note 6, at 150-51.
22. For a discussion of the types of listing contracts, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text. In most cases the exclusive right-to-sell listing contract will
establish the agency relationship between the broker and seller. Currier, Finding
the Broker's Place in the Typical Residential Real Estate Transaction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV.
655, 660 (1981) [hereinafter Currier, Finding the Broker's Place].
23. See R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 366-68 (3d ed. 1981).
24. Marmis v. Solot Co., 117 Ariz. 499, 501, 573 P.2d 899, 901 (1978) ("As
listing broker for the seller, Solot occupied a confidential and fiduciary relationship with the seller and was thereby held to the highest ethical standards of fairness and honesty." (citing Ornamental and Structural Steel, Inc. v. BBG, Inc., 20
Ariz. App. 16, 509 P.2d 1053 (1973); Baker v. Feight, 91 Ariz. 11, 370 P.2d 268
(1962)).
25. M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish, 34 Colo. App. 320, 322, 527 P.2d 912, 914 (1974)
("[A] real estate agent, in all dealings affecting the subject matter of his agency,
has a fiduciary duty to act with the utmost faith and loyalty in behalf of his principal."); Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 706, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1980)
("A real estate broker owes a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to his principal,
usually the seller") (citing Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 73 Wash. 2d 225,
437 P.2d 897 (1968)).
26. Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 675, 441 P.2d 101, 110, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 589, 598 (1968) ("[A]n agent is charged with the duty of fullest disclosure
of all material facts concerning the transaction that might affect the principal's
decision.") (quoting Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 223, 169 P.2d 371, 376
(1946)); Lerk v. McCabe, 349 Il. 348, 360-61, 182 N.E. 388, 393 (1932) ("The
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interest of his principal. 2 7 The fiduciary relationship between the
broker and the seller has been analogized to that of a trustee and
beneficiary. 28 The breach of the fiduciary duty by the broker
gives rise to a number of remedies including refusal to pay compensation, rescission of the listing contract, an action for restitu29
tion and an action for losses.
Perhaps the most important fiduciary duty the broker owes to
the principal is the "duty to disclose any material fact known to
the agent, which, if known to the principal, would possibly influence the principal's decision on the subject matter of the agency
agreement." 30 The broker has a duty to disclose any relationship
that the broker has with the buyer, including a familial, 3 ' persona 32 or business relationship. 3 3 Thus, the broker must be extremely careful of his duty to the seller when he is in any way
rule is well established in equity that the relation existing between principal and
agent for the purchase or sale of property is a fiduciary one, and the agent in the
exercise of good faith is bound to keep his principal informed on all matters that
may come to his knowledge pertaining to the subject matter of the agency."
(citing Rieger v. Brandt, 329 Ill. 21, 160 N.E. 130 (1928)).
27. Vivian Arnold Realty Co. v. McCormick, 19 Ariz. App. 289, 293-94, 506
P.2d 1074, 1078-79 (1973) ("A real estate agent owes a duty of utmost good
faith and loyalty to the principal, and one employed to sell property has the
specific duty of exercising reasonable due care and diligence to effect a sale to
the best advantage of the principal-that is on the best terms and at the best
price possible.").
28. See Rattray v. Scudden, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 222-23, 169 P.2d 371, 376
(1946) (real estate broker has same duty of loyalty and service as trustee to
beneficiary).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399 (1958) (possible remedies are
listed from a-k).
30. See Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 767, 774 (1978) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability]; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 381 (1958) ("[A]n agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts
to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and
which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have.").
31. Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 73 Wash. 2d 225, 229-30, 437 P.2d
879, 897-900 (1968) (broker's agent breached fiduciary duty by failing to disclose buyers were her sister and brother-in-law).
32. Smith v. Zak, 20 Cal. App. 3d 785, 98 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1971) (broker was
business associate of the purchaser); Loughlin v. Idora Realty Co., 259 Cal. App.
2d 619, 631, 66 Cal. Rptr. 747, 754 (1968) (broker breached fiduciary duty to
seller by failing to disclose purchaser who bought property for $11,280 and sold
it shortly thereafter for $16,500 was broker's mother-in-law); Hickam v. Colorado Real Estate Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 76, 534 P.2d 1220 (1975) (broker's
license was revoked for his failure to communicate higher offer to seller).
33. M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish, 34 Colo. App. 320, 322-23, 527 P.2d 912, 914
(1974) (broker breached fiduciary duty by failure to disclose his interest in
purchasing corporation); Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 525-26, 429 P.2d
864, 868 (1967) (subagent breached duty to disclose by failure to inform the
seller of his ownership of shares of corporate purchaser).
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affiliated with the buyer.3 4 Likewise, the broker has a duty to disclose the actual value of the listed property, particularly when the
broker is the purchaser of the property.3 5 As one court has
stated: "[i]f ...the agent by the conveyance will acquire an equitable or beneficial interest in the property, then the agent must
36
specifically disclose the nature of the interest to his principals."
As a matter of practice a broker should probably avoid the
purchase of any property that he has listed.
Clearly, any information that the seller would deem to be important or influential must be disclosed by the broker.3 7 The information usually is suppressed because of the broker placing his
individual concerns above those of the principal. The type of information considered material includes:
[a]ny circumstances affecting the buyer's ability or desire
to perform, any facts influencing the seller in his determination of a fair price, or influencing his decision as to
whether to accept or reject a particular offer, or to attempt a compromise through a counteroffer. Other perincludes
any
circumstances
tinent
information
influencing the agent's opinion as to the benefits of a
particular transaction for the seller, such as a close relationship to the purchaser, or an interest other than an
interest in a commission.38
Closely related to the duty to disclose material information
concerning the property to the principal is the duty of loyalty.
34. See Levine, Real Estate MalpracticeAreas of Liability, 18 Trial 33, 34 (1982)
("A licensee will be looked at with a jaundiced eye when the licensee acquires a
property, even when not acting as a licensee, and subsequently and quickly turns
the property for a substantial profit.") (emphasis in original).
35. Riley v. Powell, 665 S.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (broker/buyer held to have breached fiduciary duty to seller when he purchased
property and knew that property was worth considerably more than purchase
price).
36. Velten v. Robertson, 671 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Colo. App. 1983).
37. Jn Morley v. J. Pagel Realty & Insurance, 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d
1104 (1976), the court held that the broker breached his fiduciary duty to the
seller by failing to inform the seller that the purchase price of the property
should be secured by a mortgage. The court stated:
We think that as a part of appellees' [brokers'] duty to effect a sale for
appellants [sellers] on the best terms possible and to disclose to them
all the information they possessed that pertained to the prospective
transaction, appellees [brokers] were bound to inform appellants [sellers] that they should require security for the Heyden's [sellers']
performance.
Id. at 65, 550 P.2d at 1107.
38. Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability, supra note 30, at 775.
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The duty of loyalty prohibits a broker from acting for himself or
any other party without full disclosure to the principal. 311 Often
the duty of loyalty is coupled with a so called "duty of good faith"
40
to require that the broker act in the principal's best interest.
Although the duty of good faith is not specifically found in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, it is often mentioned as a duty owed
by an agent to his principal. 4' Both the duty of loyalty and good
faith, as well as the duty to disclose, only serve to reiterate the
notion that the broker must act clearly and unambiguously in the
best interest of his principal, i.e., the seller.
2.

Cooperating Brokers

In the event that the broker has signed a listing contract with
the seller, the fiduciary duty owed to that seller is relatively easy
to understand and carry out. The broker, as a result of the contractual relationship between the two parties, knows the seller
and seeks to protect his interest. However, the listing broker may
agree to "cooperate" with another broker, i.e., share the commission, in return for that broker, the selling broker, finding a buyer
42
who is ready, willing and able to purchase the property.
Cooperation among brokers has become formalized by the
widespread use of Multiple Listing Services (MLS) throughout
the country. By becoming a member of MLS, a broker agrees to
pool all listings and to cooperate with other MLS member-brokers who produce buyers for the listed property. 4 3 Any MLS
member can show any of the property listed through the MLS
without receiving a prior cooperation agreement from the broker
with the listing on that particular property. Clearly this arrange39. See M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish, 34 Colo. App. 320, 322-23, 527 P.2d 912, 914
(1974) ("This duty [of loyalty] requires the agent to make a full and complete
disclosure before he becomes the purchaser of property which is the subject of
his agency with his principal.").
40. See Lerk v. McCabe, 349 Ill. 348, 360-61, 182 N.E. 388, 393 (1973)
("[T]he agent in the exercise of good faith is bound to keep his principal informed on all matters that may come to his knowledge pertaining to the subject
matter of the agency.").
41. See Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 674-75, 441 P.2d 101, 110, 68
Cal. Rptr. 589, 598 (1968) ("This relationship not only imposes upon him
[agent] the duty of acting in the highest good faith towards his principal but
precludes the agent from obtaining any advantage over the principal ... in any
transaction had by virtue of his agency."); see generally Romero, Theories of Real
Estate Broker Liability, supra note 30, at 776-77.
42. Currier, Finding the Broker's Place, supra note 22, at 660-61.
43. See generally LEVINE, THE DUAL AGENCY TRAP 110 (1985); Austin, Real
Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1325, 1328-30 (1970); Currier, Finding the Brokers Place, supra note 2, at 661.
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ment can be beneficial to both sellers and buyers. Sellers'
properties have a much greater exposure to potential buyers and
buyers have a larger selection of available properties. The broker
who has entered into the listing contract 4 4 with the seller is called
the "listing broker" and the broker who procures the buyer is
called the "selling broker." 4 5 The selling broker, though not in a
direct contractual relationship with the seller, is held to be a sub46
agent of the listing broker, and as such, an agent of the seller.
As agent, both the listing and selling brokers are in a fiduciary relationship with the seller. 4 7 As the court in Mersky v. Multiple
Listing Bureau stated:
[T]here flows from this agency relationship and its accompanying obligation of utmost fidelity and good faith,
the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility on the part of
the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to exercise reasonable care, skill, and judgment in securing for the
principal the best bargain possible; t o scrupulously avoid
representing any interest antagonistic to that of the principal in transactions involving the principal's listed property, or otherwise self-dealing with that property,
without the explicit and fully informed consent of the
principal; and to make, in all instances, a full, fair, and
timely disclosure to the principal of all facts within the
knowledge or coming to the attention of the broker or
his sub-agents which are, or may be, material in connection with the matter for which the broker is employed,
and which might affect the principal's rights and interest
44. The majority of MLS require that the broker-members utilize an exclusive right-to-sell listing agreement; a minority will accept exclusive agency listing
contracts. FTC report, supra note 2, at 131.
45. See Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability, supra note 30, at 77173 (discussion of roles of selling and listing brokers).
46. See First Church of the Open Bible v. ClineJ. Dunton Realty, Inc., 19
Wash. App. 275, 279, 574 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1978). In Dunton, the court stated:
"In a multiple listing situation, it has been held that in effecting a sale, the selling agency is an authorized subagent of the listing broker, who is the seller's
agent for the purpose of finding a purchaser." Id. But see Blockingler v. Schlegel, 58 Ill.
App. 3d 324, 326, 374 N.E.2d 491, 493 (1978) (no fiduciary duty
existed between seller and broker/buyer by virtue of fact that property was listed
in MLS and broker/buyer was member of MLS). See also LEVINE, supra note 43,
at 110 (while selling broker is legally subagent of seller, "it is clear that the selling broker is representing the buyer").
47. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, Vol. 2, § 531.1 (1985) (Tex. Real Est. Comm.
Rules-Canons of Professional Ethics and Conduct for Real Estate Licensees);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957) ("A real estate broker or salesman, while acting as an agent for another, is a fiduciary.").
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48
or influence his actions.

This fiduciary duty is obviously recognized between the seller and
the listing broker because of the contractual privity between
them. However, the selling broker is usually not in direct contact
with the seller. 49 The selling broker's only link with the transaction may be through the buyer. The buyer, in a typical situation,
has contacted the broker and enlisted the broker to show him a
number of potentially suitable properties. 50 Not surprisingly,
both the buyer and the selling broker, may reasonably believe
51
that the selling broker is the agent of the buyer.
Despite the fact that the buyer and selling broker may believe
themselves to be in an agency relationship, the general rule is that
the selling broker is a subagent of the listing broker and thus an
agent of the seller. 52 The selling broker, as subagent, owes the
same fiduciary duties to the seller as does the listing broker. 53
48. 73 Wash. 2d 225, 229, 437 P.2d 897, 899 (1968) (emphasis supplied).
49. In most cases neither the seller nor the selling broker are aware of this
agency relationship. The seller, in many cases, will not even meet the selling
broker until she brings an offer on behalf of the buyer. Usually the listing broker
will also be present at the delivery of the offer and thus the appearance is that
the selling broker represents the buyer. See generally LEVINE, supra note 43, at
110-11 ("[T]he selling broker presents an offer on behalf of his buyer to the
seller in the presence of the listing broker. The seller has every reason to believe that the selling broker is representing the buyer. He has no reason to believe that the selling broker has any other function.").
50. In the process of selecting suitable properties to show the potential
buyer, the broker must determine the buyer's financial status and his personal
preferences concerning the real property. Obviously, the buyer discloses quite a
bit of sensitive and confidential information to the selling broker. This, as well
as the fact that the buyer and the selling broker usually spend a large amount of
time together viewing the various properties, may lead the buyer to believe,
quite reasonably, that the selling broker is acting as the buyer's agent in the
transaction. See Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability, supra note 30, at
771-74; Comment, Easton v. Strassburger: JudicialImposition of a Duty to Inspect on
California Real Estate Brokers, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 809, 819 (1985) ("In many
transactions, the purchaser may spend hours with, and place much confidence
in, the cooperating broker. In spite of this, the subagency relationship with the
seller generally precludes the establishment of a broker-purchaser agency relationship.") [hereinafter Comment,Judicial Imposition of a Dut'T to Inspect].
51. The 1983 FTC study on residential real estate brokerage indicated that
more than 70% of buyers thought the selling broker was "their" broker, and
were not aware of his agency relationship with the seller. FTC report, supra note
2, at 69.
52. See Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 224-51, 169 P.2d 371, 377-78
(1946); see generally Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6,
at 158-62.
53. Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 656, 660, 300 P.2d 855, 857-58 (1956).
The Miller court held that even though the subagent had no dealings with the
seller, the selling broker, "as a subagent, was under the same duty as [listing
broker] to act in the utmost good faith." Id.; accord First Church of the Open
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Not only does the agency relationship between the selling broker
and the seller lead to increased protection for the seller's interests, it has the unanticipated result of increasing the seller's liability to third parties for misleading statements or omissions
concerning the property. The seller, as principal, is liable for the
misrepresentations made by his agents and subagents. 54 This
agency relationship between the seller and selling broker has led
to much misunderstanding and confusion regarding the broker's
proper relationship to the buyers among the general public, 5 5 the
real estate industry5 6 and the legal profession.5 7
This misunderstanding of the relationships of the parties in a
typical residential real estate transaction may be, in part, the
cause of the increasing liability of the broker to the purchaser for
misrepresentations concerning the property. The buyer, an unrepresented party in the transaction, reasonably believes that he
Bible v. ClineJ. Dunton Realty, Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 279-80, 574 P.2d 1211,
1214-15 (1978). Contra Blocklinger v. Schlegel, 58 Il. App. 3d 324, 327, 374
N.E.2d 491, 493 (1978) (no fiduciary duty existed between seller and
buyer/broker who was also member of MLS because there was no privity of contract between parties).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 264, 256-63 (1958). At least two
commentators have proposed that the way to avoid the increased liability and
confusion caused by the subagency between the seller and selling broker is to
hold the selling broker to be the agent of the buyer. Comment, The Real Estate
Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6, at 161 ("Clearly, this over exposure to liability would be eliminated [and the buyer's representation enhanced] if the cooperating broker was considered to be the buyer's agent."); Comment, A
Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV.
1343, 1353 (1972) ("In the absence of a listing agreement between the broker
and the seller, the broker should be deemed the agent of the buyer and not the
subagent of the listing broker.") [hereinafter Comment, A Reexamination].
55. See Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability, supra note 30, at 77273. Romero noted:
Given such extensive conduct with the buyer [by selling broker], and
such minimal contact with the seller, the buyer is justified in believing
that the agent will do his best to obtain the property for the buyer at the
lowest possible price and on the most advantageous terms. Of course,
for the agent to do so is a violation of the agent's duty to the seller.
However, it would be unrealistic to expect the buyer to feel that a broker who has worked with him extensively is attempting to obtain the
highest possible price for the seller, which, in actuality is the agent's
duty.
Id.
56. See LEVINE, supra note 43, at 110 (author maintains that selling broker in
MLS situation is in dual agency with both buyer and seller); Hanna & Richardson, supra note 17.
57. See Blockingler v. Schlegel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327, 374 N.E.2d 491,
493 (1978) (broker/buyer who was member of MLS not subagent of seller); First
Church of the Open Bible v. ClineJ. Dunton Realty, Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275,
574 P.2d 1211 (1978) (selling broker in MLS situation is subagent of seller).
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is represented by the selling broker. The buyer feels that he can
safely rely on the statements that the selling broker has made concerning the property. When a statement on which the buyer relies turns out to be false, the buyer looks to "his" agent for relief.
Often, the selling agent retreats behind the agency relationship
with the seller and denies that any legal duty is owed to the buyer.
The buyer then sues the selling broker often alleging breach of
fiduciary duty as well as bringing a cause of action for fraud based
on the alleged misrepresentation. The seller and the listing agent
will also be sued on account of their liability for the acts of their
58
subagent, the selling broker.
This scenario need not be replayed repeatedly throughout
the country. Brokers must be educated as to their proper role in
the typical residential real estate transaction. While some inroads
have been made in this educational process, 59 much more material, factual information needs to be communicated and understood by the local broker. More importantly, the buyer must
understand, at the outset of the transaction, that he is not represented. Should he wish representation, he may employ a broker
and/or attorney of his choice. This type of disclosure requirement has been suggested by one commentator:
Brokers could be required by law or regulation to inform
buyers of the agency relationship the broker has directly
with some sellers, through listing agreements, and indirectly with others, through multiple listing arrangements. The broker would have to explain that he may
not volunteer more information than the owner of the
home would have to disclose nor give advice about the
appropriate price or subjective qualities of the houses
60
inspected.
A standardized, clearly written, printed disclosure given to
the potential buyer at the first meeting with the broker would
clarify the broker-buyer relationship from the start. The buyer
would be aware of the broker's role as a representative of the
seller, and would be less likely to rely unquestioningly on the broker. Since the buyer would be less likely to rely on the selling
broker, the broker's potential liability for fraud or misrepresentation should be lessened-the buyer would be aware that he must
58. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 264, 256-63 (1958).
59. Set, supra note 51.
60. Currier, Finding the Brokers Place, supra note 22, at 679.
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search out new avenues of information concerning the property.
A disclosure form would also benefit the broker by serving as a
constant reminder that he is the agent of the seller and must not
give the buyer any misleading signals.
B.

The Broker's Duty to the Buyer

1. Implied Agency
In the usual situation, the broker, either listing or selling, is
not in an express agency relationship with the buyer. The buyer,
however, may attempt to claim that he and the broker were in fact
in an agency relationship. Generally this will be a difficult task
because of the lack of a contractual arrangement between the broker and buyer and because of the formal listing agreement between the seller and the listing broker and the cooperation
agreement between the listing and selling brokers. Nonetheless,
the mere existence of a written listing agreement between the
seller and the broker does not automatically negate the notion
that the buyer may also be the broker's principal. 6' Perhaps the
strongest indication that the broker and the seller are in an
agency relationship is that the seller pays the broker's commission. 6 2 The commission is usually paid out of the proceeds the
seller receives at closing. This payment arrangement is clearly
spelled out in the listing agreement. 63 Although the payment of
the commission by the seller is a very strong indicator that the
broker is the agent of the seller, it is by no means conclusive. In
certain circumstances the broker may in fact be paid by the seller,
61. PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn. 1978) (jury
question as to whether broker acting for buyer and seller); Billington v.
Crowder, 553 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tenn. 1977) (broker can act for seller, buyer or
both); Mays v. Emery, 3 Wash. App. 31, 475 P.2d 124, 128 (1970) (agency relationship between seller's broker and buyer arose when broker undertook to have
an inspection of property conducted for buyer); see also 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 31
(1980) ("The question as to whom a broker represents in a transaction is determinable from the facts.").
62. See Comment, The Real Estate Broker s FiduciaryDuties, supra note 6, at 154
(faced with broker paying seller's commission, coupled with lawyer's apparent
non-involvement, buyer must come forth with strong evidence to negate broker's fiduciary duties as being owed solelv to seller).
63. The payment of the purchase price by the buyer is obviously the ultimate source of the broker's commission. In practice many buyers may feel that
they are actually paying the commission. At least one commentator has recognized the irony of this situation: "If the superiority of the broker-seller relationship is based on the broker's compensation flowing from the seller, it is
therefore undermined to the extent that the commission is buried in the sales
price." Currier, Findiug the Brokers Place, spila note 22, at 664.
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yet in fact represent the buyer. 6 4 These situations, however, are
infrequent and the buyer must rely on the court or jury to infer an
agency relationship from the facts of the case. Certainly, a buyer
cannot rely on the somewhat capricious nature of our judicial system to establish an agency relationship with the broker.
2.

The Dual Agency Problem

One problem that quickly arises when the courts find that the
broker acted for the buyer as well as the seller is that of dual
agency. Although the broker can legally act as an agent for both
parties in a real estate transaction, he must make full disclosure to
both before the agency relationship begins. 6 5 The broker owes
both parties the same fiduciary duties, 66 and this, in turn, leads to
an impossible situation for the broker. The parties to the transaction have diametrically opposed goals. The seller wants to receive the highest price possible for the property, while the buyer
would like to purchase the property at a lower price. Disclosures
made to one party in many instances will certainly not be in the
best interest of the other, and thus, the broker will have breached
his fiduciary duty. 6 7 Clearly the broker is in a no-win situation.
64. See Ramey v. Myers, 111 Cal. App. 2d 679, 245 P.2d 360, 364 (1952)
(broker/buyer agency relationship inferred from broker and buyer's friendship
and fact that broker gave buyer advice) ; Banner v. Elm, 251 Md. 694, 248 A.2d
452 (1968) ("It is not uncommon for a condition of sale to be that the agent of
the purchaser shall be paid by the seller."); Billington v. Crowder, 553 S.W.2d
590, 593 (Tenn. 1977) ("Even though the identity of the party who is to pay the
broker may not be conclusive of the identity of his principal, it is nevertheless a
strong circumstance.").
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1957). The Restatement
provides:
An agent who, to the knowledge of two principals, acts for both of them
in a transaction between them, has a duty to act with fairness to each
and to disclose to each all facts which he knows or should know would
reasonably affect the judgement of each in permitting such dual agency,
except as to a principal who has manifested that he knows such facts or
does not care to know them.
Id.
66. For a discussion of the fiduciary duties a broker owes his principal, see
supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957) (An agent is "not to
use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or
his agency . . . to the injury of the
acquired by him during the course of ...
principal."); see Marmis v. Solot Co., 117 Ariz. App. 499, 502, 573 P.2d 902
("Chapparal (buyer) contended Solot's (broker's) position as a fiduciary was
compromised and it attempted to serve two masters by entering into a fiduciary
relationship with chapparal, a prospective buyer. The undertaking of such a
dual representation of conflicting interests, without knowledge or approval of
the competing principals, would, of course, not be countenanced."): see also
Comment, The Real Esine Brokers Fiduciaiy Duties. sLtpra note 6, at 162-63.
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Even if the disclosure of the dual agency is made to both parties,
the broker still runs the risk of breach of the fiduciary duty owed
to an individual party. 68 The broker has the duty to disclose any
material fact that might affect the principal's decision to buy or
sell the property, 6 9 and by attempting to represent both the buyer
and the seller he has placed himself in a situation almost guaranteed to breach the duty to disclose. Although the broker may be,
in theory, capable of acting on behalf of both parties in a real
estate transaction, 70 in practice, the broker would be fool-hardy
to attempt to do so; he could be likened to the attorney who attempts to represent both parties in a divorce action.
3.

The Buyer's Broker

The buyer, in order to be assured that he will be adequately
represented in the real estate transaction, can always hire a broker
and pay the commission himself. The broker would then unequivocally represent the buyer and no problems of misplaced
loyalty would occur. 7 1 The crucial element in the broker-buyer
agency relationship is that the buyer pay the broker's fee, because
of the presumption that the party who pays the commission is the
broker's principal. 72 A few courts and commentators have maintained that the broker was the agent of the buyer even though the
commission was to be paid by the seller. 7 3 Even though there are
a number of cases in which the court has held that the broker
owed a fiduciary duty to the buyer (although the seller was paying
68. SeeJorgensen v. Beach 'N' Bay Realty, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 3d, 155, 160,
177 Cal. Rptr. 882, 885 (1981) (brokers disclosed dual agency to seller but jury
question was presented as to whether brokers disclosed all material facts which
might have affected seller's decision to accept buyer's offer).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958); see Comment, Real Estate Brokers Liabilityfor Failure to Disclose, supra note 3, at 333, 336.
70. The Realtor Code of Ethics does not prohibit a broker from acting as a
dual agent. Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6, at
162.
71. But see Velten v. Robertson, 671 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1983). In I'elten the
broker was to be compensated by the buyer, yet was held to be in a dual agency
because he contacted the seller and obtained both the buyer and seller's signatures on the documents. The court held his failure to disclose his financial interest in the property a breach of his fiduciary duty to the seller. Id. at 1012. For a
discussion of the case, see Natelson, Colorado 'Buyer Brokerage: Does It Still Exist
After Velton v. Robertson?, 55 U. CoLo. L. REV. 83 (1983) [hereinafter Natelson,
Colorado 'Buo'er Brokerage].
72. For a discussion of the presumption, see supra note 62 and accompanying text. See also Prichard v. Reitz, 178 Cal. App. 3d 445, 223 Cal. Rptr. 734
(1986) (broker/vendor who took commission on sale is holding him/herself as
broker in transaction and owes duty of disclosure to buyer).
73. See Natelson, Colorado 'BuYer Brokerage, "supra note 71, at 84-85.
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the commission), those courts found the duty to the buyer was in
addition to that already owed to the seller by virtue of the listing
agreement.7 4 Thus, in order to be absolutely certain that the broker will be exclusively in an agency relationship with the buyer,
the commission should be entirely paid by the buyer.
The present structure of the MLS and its pervasive use
throughout the residential real estate industry raises interesting
questions for the broker who wishes to exclusively represent buyers. As previously stated, the MLS is a formalized method for
broker cooperation. 75 The cooperating brokers in the MLS system are paid by the seller and are considered in an agency relationship with the seller. The broker who finds a buyer ready,
willing and able to purchase the property is considered the subagent of the listing broker. The question arises as to whether or
not a broker seeking to maintain an exclusive agency relationship
with the buyer can utilize the MLS in order to find a suitable
property. Certainly, it would seem that if the broker received any
part of his fee from the seller, there is a danger that he has placed
himself in an agency situation with that seller. Even if the broker's fee is paid only by the buyer, the information that the MLS
provides concerning each listed property may be such that the
broker would also be considered the seller's agent. 76 A court
could reasonably conclude that the MLS is organized in such a
way that only brokers in an agency relationship with the seller
should have access to its information and a broker, by accessing
the data, becomes an agent of the seller. 77 The possibility of the
broker who represents the buyer also becoming the agent of the
74. Marmis v. Solot Co., 117 Ariz. App. 499, 573 P.2d 899 (1977);Jorgensen v. Beach 'N' Bay Realty, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 3d 155, 177 Cal. Rptr. 882
(1981); cf. Velten v. Robertson, 671 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1983) (buyer to pay commission yet broker also held to be seller's agent).
75. For a discussion of the MLS procedure, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
76. For example, the information furnished in the MLS guide could include
that the seller was hoping for a quick sale. Clearly the seller would not want a
broker representing the buyer to be privy to this type of information and would
certainly not want the information communicated to the buyer.
77. This position may be further strengthened by the fact that the seller
must consent to allow his property to be listed within the MLS system. In many
cases, the seller would not consent to the listing if brokers who represent buyers
also have access to all of the information. See Natelson, Colorado 'Buo'er Brokerage,
supra note 71, at 85. Natelson stated:
For example, a buyer who asks a real estate broker to assist him in finding property may think of the broker as 'his broker', but in fact the
broker is the agent or subagent of the seller and owes fiduciary duties
to the seller. The rationale for this position appears to be that one who
elects to attempt to sell property listed within an MLS system does so
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seller as a result of MLS access is very real. The broker attempting to maintain an exclusive relationship with the buyer should be
aware of the potential for conflict of interest and dual agency.
Despite the fact that a buyer is free to hire a broker to represent him in the real estate transaction, the majority of buyers do
not take advantage of this opportunity. The basic reason for this
is that the broker's fee will be an expense in addition to the sale
price and other costs that a buyer incurs in the purchase of real
property. Most buyers will not be able to scrape together the necessary cash to pay the broker as well as the other expenses such as
down payment, loan acquisition fees, insurance and miscellaneous closing costs. The current industry norm-both the listing
and selling brokers' commissions paid out of the sales price received by the seller-is probably preferred by many buyers simply
because of the cash flow problems they incur in the purchase of
real property.
While buyer's brokerage may be an idea that would provide
the solution to the lack of representation of most buyers in the
usual residential real estate transaction, as a practical matter the
idea will not work in the majority of situations because of the
commission arrangements. 7 8 Thus, the need for buyer education
as to the role of the broker, both the selling and listing, is further
emphasized. The only way to dissuade the buyer from the notion
that the broker, particularly the selling broker, is representing
him is through a formalized, written disclosure document that
clearly states the broker's relationship with the seller. 7- A clear,
simple disclosure form will be a step in the right direction in
preventing the buyer from harboring the mistaken belief that the
with the consent of the individual who placed the property in the system, and is paid by that individual.
Id.
78. Currier, Finding the Broker's Place, supra note 22, at 664. Currier noted:
Nothing theoretically prohibits a buyer from hiring a broker, agreeing
to pay a fee for services, and thus creating a principal-agent relationship. In practice, however, this seldom occurs. The organization and
operation of the residential brokerage business discourages such arrangements. Home buyers understand that brokers will receive compensation from sellers, and they know that brokers will work with them
without additional charge.
Id.; see also Comment, The Real Estate Broker s Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6, at 156.

79. For a discussion of buyer confusion as to broker presentation, see supra
notes 51 & 60 and accompanying text. According to a National Family Opinion.
Inc. (NFO) survey, 57% of buyers who were involved in cooperating sales believed that the cooperating broker represented them. FTC report, supra note 2,
at buyer question 31.
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broker is acting in his best interest and will also alert the buyer to
the fact that he may need to hire independent representation.
III.

BROKER'S DUTIES TO THE BUYER

A.

The Fiduciary Duty

The lack of an agency relationship between the broker and
the buyer, originally led most courts to find that the broker owed
no fiduciary duty to the buyer. The rationale for this conclusion
was that the broker, as agent for the seller, stood in the seller's
shoes and had the same relationship to the buyer as did the
seller.8 0 However, a number of courts have found that regardless
of the fact that the broker and buyer are not in any agency situation, the broker does owe a legal duty to the buyer and the courts
8
characterize this duty as a fiduciary one. In Harper v. Adametz 1
the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a real estate broker
breached his fiduciary duty to the buyer when he failed to disclose
the buyer's offer to the seller.8 2 The court then imposed a constructive trust on the broker in favor of the buyer. The court
stated:
It is true that [a constructive trust] is most often applied
in situations where the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant is one which equity clearly recognizes
as fiduciary. But equity has carefully refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in
such a manner as to exclude new situations. It has left
the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable
trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority
83
and influence on the other.
Thus, the court clearly recognized that the broker owed a legal
duty to the buyer even though they were not in a contractual
relationship.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Funk v. Tifft

84

held that a real estate broker had a fiduciary duty to

deal fairly and honestly with a prospective purchaser and that
80. See Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 54, at 1345.
81. 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955).

82. Id. at 222-25, 113 A.2d at 138-39. The broker in this case, failed to tell
the seller of the buyer's offer and then purchased the property through his son.
The broker then sold a portion of the property, at a profit, to the buyer and led

the buyer to believe that the original owner was the seller. Id.
83. Id. at 225, 113 A.2d at 139 (citations omitted).
84. 515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 1

958

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32: p. 939

duty was breached when the broker outbid the purchaser.8 5 The
court stated, "[w]hen a real estate broker acts as an intermediary
between a seller and a prospective buyer, he is under a duty to
deal fairly and honestly with the prospective buyer. That duty is
breached when the real estate agent outbids the prospective
buyer without notice to him before the seller has acted on his
offer."86

A fiduciary relationship can be created when one party, the
buyer, places trust and confidence in another party, the broker,
because of the broker's superior skill and expertise in the transaction. 87

"More

specifically, a fiduciary relationship is created

where one party has expressly reposed trust and confidence in the
other; where trust and confidence, although not express, are implied because of a past history of fiduciary dealings; or where the
88
very nature of the transaction is fiduciary."
However, certainly not all courts have been willing to find a
fiduciary relationship between the broker and the purchaser. 89 In
fact, in a number of cases with facts quite similar to Harper and
Funk the courts have expressly found that no fiduciary duty existed between the broker and buyer. In Klotz v. Fauber,90 the Virginia Supreme Court held that the real estate broker did not
breach a fiduciary duty to the buyer by purchasing the property
from the seller, even though the broker did not even transmit the
buyer's offer to the seller. 9 1 The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas85. Id. at 25.
86. Id.
87. See Fairfield Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kroll, 106 Ill.
App. 2d 296, 303-05,
246 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (1969) (broker who undertook to obtain financing for
elderly purchaser held to be in fiduciary relationship with purchaser).
88. Comment, Expansion of a Real Estate Broker's Duties: Is Easton v. Strassburger in Illinois' Future? 5 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 97, 103 [hereinafter Comment, Expansion of a Real Estate Broker's Duties]; see J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§§ 902, 956 (5th ed. 1941).
89. See Blocklinger v. Schlegel, 58 11. App. 3d 324, 327, 374 N.E.2d 491,
493 (1978) ("Before a fiduciary duty arises it must be proven that a realtor has
been employed by someone and that he is therefore an agent for them."). But see
Fairfield Sa'. & Loan Ass'n v. Kroll, 106 Il1. App. 2d 296, 305, 246 N.E.2d 327,
331 (1969) (although broker not employed by buyer, agency relationship still
arose).
90. 213 Va. 1, 189 S.E.2d 45 (1972).
91. Id. at 2, 189 S.E.2d at 45. The Virginia Supreme Court first stated the
rule in this area to be that "a real estate agent is liable to a prospective buyer
when the agent fails to transmit the prospective buyer's offer and buys the property for his own account at a price equal to or less than the price the prospective
buyer agreed to pay." Id. (emphasis added). Next, the court found that "[t]he
amended motion for judgment in this case does not allege that Klotz (broker)
agreed to buy the property at a price that equalled or exceeded the price paid by
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sachusetts in DiBurro v. Bonasia 112 held that the broker did not
breach a fiduciary duty to the buyer when he was asked by the
prospective buyer 93 to determine if a particular piece of property
was worth the asking price. 9 4 The broker learned that the seller
was willing to sell the property the buyer was interested in as well
as an adjoining tract. 9 5 The broker eventually purchased both
tracts without informing the potential buyer. 96 The court held
that no constructive trust could be imposed because the broker
97
was not in an agency relationship with the buyer.
The dissenting opinion in Funk points out that the broker in
this case did transmit the prospective buyer's offer to the seller
and then offered the seller a better deal and the seller chose to
accept the broker's offer rather than wait for more offers. 98 The
dissent maintains that "[w]here the broker is not the agent of the
prospective buyer, where he acts with the knowledge of his principal, the seller, where there is no misuse of confidential information, where there is no fraudulent misrepresentation, and where
the broker bids more than any of the prospective buyers, there
should be no liability on the part of the broker if the seller
chooses to accept his offer without asking for another round of
bids." 9 9 The dissenting opinion in Funk argues that only those
acts which have traditionally been held to be a breach of an
agent's fiduciary duty such as fraudulent misrepresentation, misuse of confidential information and failure to disclose a conflicting agency relationship should be the basis of liability.' 0 0 Yet,
perhaps the better way of viewing the relationship of the broker
and the buyer is not as a fiduciary one, but as a normal business
relationship in which the broker must not intentionally or negligently mislead the buyer.
The recognition of a fiduciary duty between the broker and
Fauber." Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint. Id. But see Funk v.
Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1975) ("When a real estate agent acts as an intermediary between a seller and a prospective buyer, he is under a duty to deal
fairly and honestly with the prospective buyer. That duty is breached when the
real estate agent outbids that prospective buyer without notice to him before the
seller has acted on his offer.").
92. 321 Mass. 12, 71 N.E.2d 401 (1947).
93. Id. at 13, 71 N.E.2d at 401.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 15, 71 N.E.2d at 402.
98. 515 F.2d at 28.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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buyer (absent an agency relationship between the parties) will
give rise to the same types of duties owed in a principal-agent
relationship. These would, of course, include the duties of honesty, loyalty and full disclosure of material information concerning the property.' 0 ' If the broker breached any of these duties,
the buyer would have a cause of action against the broker. The
broker is in virtually the same position as he would be in a dual
agency situation.' 0 2 The broker would have to totally disregard
his agency relationship with the seller and act as agent for both
parties. As discussed previously, acting as agent for both parties,
even with the best of intentions, is a thankless and often impossible job. Surely the courts which have imposed a fiduciary relationship on the broker and the buyer do not intend to place the
broker in a position in which it is almost certain that he will
breach his fiduciary duty to one of the parties.
In many cases, these courts are using the term "fiduciary
duty" as synonymous with a duty to treat the buyer honestly and
fairly. 0 3 The reason the courts find it necessary to impose a fiduciary duty on the broker is that, traditionally, the seller's relationship with the buyer was one of caveat emptor 0 4 and the broker,
as the seller's agent, also was acting under caveat emptor. Thus,
the courts, in order to circumvent the harsh doctrine of caveat
emptor, found that the broker had not just a duty to deal fairly
with the buyer, but to deal as one in a fiduciary relationship
would-with utmost trust and confidence. This well-meaning attempt by the courts to protect the buyer may have had the unintended result of putting the broker in an untenable legal
05
position.'
B.

The Public Interest Theory

Where the courts have been reluctant to find a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the buyer, a public policy ration101. For a discussion of these fiduciary duties, see supra notes 23-41 and
accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of the dual agency problem, see supra notes 65-70 and
accompanying text.
103. In fact, in Funk, the court imposed a fiduciary duty on the broker to
deal honestly and fairly with the buyer. 515 F.2d at 24-25.
104. Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 54, at 1345.
105. As one commentator has stated: "On one hand, the broker has an
established agency relationship with the seller. On the other hand, the uncertainty of the law leaves a broker in the insecure position of fulfilling vague fiduciary duties toward the buyer in order to avoid possible future liability."
Comment, The Real Estate Brokers Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6, at 167.
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ale has been invoked in several cases to impose a duty on the
broker to act fairly and honestly toward the buyer.10 These cases
recognize that the broker cannot totally disregard the interests of
the buyer, yet he is not in a relationship which could result in an
undesirable dual agency. The broker has a duty to the public to
act fairly and ethically. As the Supreme Court of Florida stated in
Zichlin v. Dill:l0 7 "Those dealing with a licensed broker may naturally assume that he possesses the requisites of an honest, ethical
man."108

The duty of the broker to act honestly and ethically toward
the buyer is based on the statutes which govern the licensing and
activities of the broker.' 0 9 In Zichlin the court cited the Florida
statute that states that "all [real estate broker] applicants who are
natural persons shall be competent, honest, truthful, trustworthy,
of good character, and bear a reputation for fair dealing."' 10 The
court found that the broker, because of his status under the law
and the high standards of his qualifications, owes a duty to the
public which is separate and apart from the agent/principal relationship of the broker and the seller.' ''
In Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 1 12 the real estate broker failed
to communicate the plaintiff's offer to the seller and the property
was sold to another party for $250 less than the plaintiff's offer.1 13 The Supreme Court of Louisiana examined the Louisiana
statutes dealing with real estate brokers and determined that the
real estate brokerage business was vested with a public trust and
that the real estate broker owed a duty to the public. This duty
was breached when the broker failed to communicate the higher
offer to the seller.' "4 Amato is rather unusual in that the buyer,
106. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 741, 336 P.2d 534, 537 (1959); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 97-98, 25 So. 2d 4, 4-5 (1946); Amato v. Latter & Blum,
Inc., 227 La. 538, 541-43, 79 So. 2d 873, 875-76 (1955).
107. 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946).
108. Id. at 98, 25 So. 2d at 5.
109. Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6, at 168.
110. 157 Fla. at 98, 25 So. 2d at 4 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.1 (West
1981)).
111. Id. at 97-98, 25 So. 2d at 4. In Zichlin, the broker told the buyer that
the property could not be purchased for less than $5500 and then purchased the
property from the seller, using the buyer's own money, for $4500. Id. at 97, 25
So. 2d at 4. He then allowed the buyer to believe that he was purchasing the
property from the seller for $5500. Id.
112. 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955).
113. Id. at 539, 79 So. 2d at 874.
114. Id. at .540-44, 79 So. 2d at 875-76.
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not the seller, is the complainant in this case.' 15 The seller, the
principal of the broker, was not complaining about the failure of
the broker to communicate the higher offer.' 16 The court recognized that the broker must deal fairly and ethically with the buyer,
even though the broker is not in a fiduciary relationship with the
buyer.''

7

Ward v. Taggart lis is another case in which the broker misrepresented the seller's price to the buyer, then used the buyer's
money to purchase the property and sold the property to the
buyer at a profit. The California court used the California statutes dealing with the licensing and conduct of real estate brokers
to establish that the broker had a duty to the general public to act
in an honest and ethical manner." 9 The court refused to condone such fraudulent activities even though the broker and the
buyer were not in a fiduciary agency relationship. 120
Clearly in Ward and Zichlin the brokers were engaged in
fraudulent activities and the courts were utilizing the vague "duty
to act ethically and fairly" to prohibit this sort of fraudulent and
misleading conduct. However, in Amato the punished conduct is
not as clearly fraudulent or misleading as in the other two cases.
The broker in Amato, by failing to present all offers to the seller,
clearly breached his duty to the seller. 12 1 Yet, not all courts believe that the broker's duty to present all offers to the seller is a
duty upon which the buyer can rely. 12 2 Thus, the court in Amato
appears to be recognizing a general duty of the broker to act ethically and honestly even if the buyer is unable to prove fraud or
misrepresentation.
Once again, as in the case of the imposition of a fiduciary
duty between the broker and the buyer, the courts are attempting
115. Id. at 539, 79 So. 2d at 874.
116. Id. at 539-40, 79 So. 2d at 874.
117. Id. at 539, 79 So. 2d at 874.
118. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
119. Id. at 741, 336 P.2d at 537.
120. Id.
121. The broker must disclose to the seller any information concerning the
property which the seller would deem to be important or material. For a discussion of the broker's duty of disclosure, see supra notes 23-41 and accompanying
text.
122. See Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. at 546, 79 So. 2d at 876
(Hamiter, J., dissenting) ("Unquestionably, the legislation invoked was enacted
in the interest and for the protection of the public. But thereby the Legislature,
in my opinion, intended only to protect those members of the general public to
whom the agent or broker owed a duty either pursuant to a contract or by operation of law.").
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to circumvent the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor through the
imposition of a duty to act honestly, fairly and ethically. In fact,
the court in Zichlin recognizes that by requiring "a high standard
of qualifications" of real estate brokers the state was eliminating
the old caveat emptor doctrine. 1 23 At the time that Zichlin, Amato,
and Ward were decided, the doctrine of caveat emptor was still a
viable legal doctrine. Today, however, the doctrine has virtually
124
been eliminated in the real estate context.
These courts, unlike the courts which have found a fiduciary
duty between the broker and the buyer, may have established a
more workable standard of conduct for the broker to follow.
While the broker still has a duty to act fairly in regard to the
buyer, there is no establishment of a fiduciary duty between the
two parties. Thus, there will be no danger of the unintended dual
agency. The broker will remain exclusively the agent of the seller,
but will have to act in a fair and ethical manner toward the buyer.
Certainly this is not an egregious standard to maintain. The real
estate broker, because of his close connections with the buyer,
should be bound by an express, legal duty to deal fairly with that
buyer.
Some commentators have criticized the establishment of a
legal duty between the buyer and broker based on public policy
rationale because of the uncertainty of the standard to be applied
to the broker's conduct. As one commentator states, "Since the
broker is obligated to act in the best interest of the seller, there
may be situations where the broker's conduct borders the line between a violation of fiduciary duties owed to the seller, and a violation of public fairness."i 25 Without a doubt there is some merit
in this criticism of the duty of honest and fairness; however, in
recent years there has been a growing trend in many areas of law
to impose a standard of good faith and fair dealing on the parties
123. "The state, therefore has prescribed a high standard of qualifications
and by the same law granted a form of monopoly and in so doing the old rule of
caveat emptor is cast aside." Zichlin, 157 Fla. at 98, 25 So. 2d at 4-5.
124. See Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchase of a Defective
Home, 49 J. URB. L. 533 (1972); Jaeger, Emerging Concept: Consumer Protection in
Statutory Regulation, Products Liability and the Sale of New Homes, 11 VAL. U.L. REV.
335 (1977); McNamara, Implied Warranty in New-Home Construction: Has the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor Been Abolished?, 1 REAL ESTATE L.J. 43 (1972); Comment,
Home Sales. A Crack in the Caveat Emptor Shield, 29 MERCER L. REv. 323 (1977).
125. Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties, supra note 6, at 169.
Another commentator states: "The public interest approach is a vague and
guideless standard. It requires a determination as to the social desirability of a
broker's particular act based upon virtually undefined considerations." Comment, A Reexamination, supra note 54, at 1348.
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of all sorts of transactions.'12 6 This trend in the law should not
bypass the real estate industry. While the broker's ultimate duty
and responsibility is to his principal, the seller, this duty does not
absolutely prevent the broker from dealing with the buyer in an
ethical and fair manner. The public should have the right to expect that the broker, even though employed by the seller, will act
in a fair and honest manner, and if this expectation proves to be
false, the broker should be liable for the failure to act in such a
manner.
The question now becomes whether courts should recognize
a "duty to act honestly and fairly" or whether the current statutes
and court decisions dealing with intentional, negligent and innocent misrepresentation will suffice to adequately protect the
buyer's rights vis-a-vis the broker in the residential real estate
transaction.
C. Tort Causes of Action
1. Introduction
The broker, despite the lack of an agency relationship with
the buyer, can be held liable to the buyer for a misrepresentation
made concerning the property. Most courts hold that the broker
will be liable to the buyer for an intentional misrepresentation.
However, there are many cases which impose liability for negligent as well as innocent misrepresentation. Some courts have
foregone the misrepresentation analysis altogether and have
based liability on the tort of negligence. These tort cases, both
for misrepresentation and negligence, evidence a trend in the law
to hold the broker accountable to the buyer. While the older
cases struggled with the notions of fiduciary duty and public policy, these recent cases are utilizing traditional tort notions to form
the basis of the broker's duty to the buyer.
126. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) ("Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and its enforcement."); see Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958) ("There is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement."); see also Fergus
v. Wilmarth, 117 Ill. 542, 7 N.E. 508 (1886); Cottman Co. v. Continental Trust
Co., 169 Md. 595, 182 A. 551 (1936); Starkman v. Sigmond, 184 N.J. Super.
600, 446 A.2d 1249 (Ch Div. 1982). But see English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521,
522 (Tex. 1983) ("The novel concept [the theory of good faith and fair dealing]
advocated by the courts below would abolish our system of government according to settled rules of law and let each case be decided upon what might seem
'fair and in good faith,' by each fact finder.").
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2.

M1isrepresentation

a.

Intentional Misrepresentation

At common law, the elements of the tort of deceit were stated
as follows: 1. a false representation of a fact; 2. knowledge by the
defendant that the information is false (or lack of a basis for making the representation); 3. intent to induce the plaintiff to rely on
the information, either in the form of acting or refraining from
acting on the information; 4. justifiable reliance on the representation by the plaintiff; 5. damage to the plaintiff resulting from the
27
reliance on the representation.1
The courts have recognized that because of the lack of an
agency relationship or other type of fiduciary relationship between the broker and the buyer, some sort of legal protection
must be afforded to the buyer. This protection has traditionally
taken the form of liability of the seller and/or the broker for misrepresentation of fact concerning the property which is known or
should have been known by the seller and/or broker. 28 As the
29
court stated in the California case of Lingsch v. Savage:'
It is now settled in California that where the seller
knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known or accessible only to
him and also knows that such facts are not known to, or
within the reach of the diligent attention and observation
of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them
to the buyer....
The real estate agent or broker representing the
seller is a party to the business transaction. .

.

. Where

such agent or broker possesses, along with the seller, the
requisite knowledge .

.

. whether he acquires it from, or

independently of, his principal, he is under the same
30
duty of disclosure.'
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &

127. W.
[HE LAW
KEETON].

128. See Comment, Judicial Imposition of a Duty to Inspect, supra note 50, at

820.
129. 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).
130. Id. at 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05 (citations omitted). In Lingsch,
the purchasers brought suit against the real estate broker and seller for fraud.
Id. at 732, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203. The purchasers alleged that both the broker and
.the seller knew that the building was in disrepair and that the building had been
closed for condemnation. Id. at 733, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203. The court found that
the broker's nondisclosure of the information would constitute fraud even
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Clearly the court is using the fraud cause of action to mitigate
the lack of buyer protection caused by the agency to mitigate the
lack of buyer protection caused by the agency relationship between the seller and broker. Also, the development, through the
fraud cause of action, of an affirmative duty of disclosure of material facts concerning the property by both the seller and broker, is
an erosion of the rule of caveat emptor. In Lingsch, the defendants raised the doctrine of caveat emptor as a defense to their
duty to disclose the defects concerning the property. However,
the court refused to recognize the validity of the caveat emptor
doctrine in this case and stated, "[t]he present tendency is, however, to class concealment as actual fraud in those cases where the
seller knows of facts which materially affect the desirability of the
property which he knows are unknown to the buyer . .. ."31
The courts have had no difficulty in imposing liability on the
broker who knowingly makes a misrepresentation concerning the
property to the purchaser. 32 Intentional fraud on the part of the
broker has been found in a variety of situations, for example,
where a misrepresentation was made as to the zoning of the property;' 3 3 where the sales agents of a condominium project misrep' 34
resented units as "luxurious" and "outstanding investments;"'
where the broker failed to reveal to the purchaser that the property was the site of the murder of a woman and her four children
ten years earlier.' 3 5 Without a doubt, the imposition of a duty on
the broker and the seller to disclose material information conthough the property was sold "as is" and there was no contractual privity between the broker and buyer. Id. at 740-41, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
131. Id. (quoting Dyke v. Zaiser, 80 Cal. App. 2d 639, 653, 182 P.2d 344,
353 (1947)).
132. See Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983)
(broker knew that home was site of multiple murder and should have disclosed
that fact to buyer); Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955)
(broker unknowingly misrepresented negotiations between buyer and seller;
court found fraud as well as fiduciary relationship between broker and buyer).
133. Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 544 P.2d 694 (1976).
134. Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976)
(agents knew condominiums were built in substandard manner). The court in
Cooper held "a real estate broker or agent in the sale of real estate is liable for
damages caused by nondisclosure to the buyer of defects known to him and unknown to and unobservable by the buyer." Id. at 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 727
(citations omitted).
135. Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983). The
court found that three considerations were relevant to the determination of materiality of the misrepresentation: "the gravity of the harm inflicted by nondisclosure; the fairness of imposing a duty of discovery on the buyer as an
alternative to compelling disclosure, and the impact on the stability of contracts
if rescission is permitted." Id. at 266, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
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cerning the property which they know and which the buyer is unable to discover is justifiable from a public policy standpoint. The
doctrine of caveat emptor is no longer viable in the modern real
estate transaction. 136 Today's buyer does not have the time nor
the expertise necessary to discover latent defects of the property.
The real estate broker, as a professional, must be responsible to
disclose these defects to the buyer. This duty is easily met when
the defects are known to the broker. However, the duty to disclose material defects of the property has not been limited to
those defects of which the broker has actual knowledge.
b.

Negligent Misrepresentation

In most situations the broker will receive the vast majority of
the information concerning the property from the seller. The
broker will then relate this information to the potential buyer. In
the multiple listing situation the information received from the
seller is distributed among all the member brokers. If this information is incorrect or if the seller fails to provide complete information, the broker may unintentionally misrepresent a material
fact or facts concerning the property. The question becomes
whether the broker should be liable to the buyer for merely relating incorrect information or failing to relate information which
was not known by the broker. Many, if not most courts, have
found that the broker is liable for the misrepresentation and cannot escape liability by asserting that he was only a conduit of information or did not have actual knowledge that the information
37
was incorrect. 1
The elements necessary to prove negligent misrepresentation are basically the same as those of intentional misrepresentation. The major difference is that the plaintiff does not have to
prove that the defendant made the misrepresentation with an intent to deceive or had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements.' 38 As the Minnesota Supreme Court in Berryman v.
136. For a discussion of this outdated doctrine, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
137. See Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1975) (broker could
be liable under Delaware Consumer Fraud Act for misrepresenting basement of
home did not have water leakage problem even though he never investigated or
asked seller about water problem); First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J.
Dunton Realty, Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 574 P.2d 1211 (1978) (listing broker
was held liable for misrepresentation of land area even though he did not personally point out erroneous boundary).
138. See Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 111. App. 3d 257, 259, 389
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stated:

The rule governing recovery on the basis of fraud requires the plaintiff to show that defendant made a false
representation of a past or existing fact, susceptible of
knowledge, knowing it to be false or without knowing
whether it was true or false, with the intention of inducing the person to whom it was made to act in reliance
upon it or under such circumstances that such person
was justified in so acting and was thereby deceived or
40
induced to so act to his damage.'
Thus, even though the broker may have had an honest belief
in the truth of the statement, it may be used as a basis for a cause
of action in negligent misrepresentation. As Prosser and Keeton
state: "A representation made with an honest belief in its truth
may still be negligent, because of lack of reasonable care in ascertaining the facts, or in the manner of expression, or absence of
the skill and competence required by a particular . . . profession."' 14 1 The broker should not be allowed to be viewed as a
mere conduit of information between the seller and the buyer.
The broker must, in some way, verify the information that the
seller is giving him concerning the property. Clearly, if the broN.E.2d 623, 625 (1979); Berryman v. Riegert, 175 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Minn.
1970).
139. 175 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1970).
140. Id. at 442 (citations omitted) (broker misrepresented that home was
"high and dry," and held liable even though he did not actually know of water
seepage problem).
The Illinois court in Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Fischer, 67 Ill.
App. 2d 315, 214 N.E.2d 612 (1966), found the standard for negligent misrepresentation to be as follows:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the
information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and
communicating the information which its recipient is justified in
expecting, and
(b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose
guidance the information was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction
in which it was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical therewith.
Id. at 325, 214 N.E.2d at 617 (quoting Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chatanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821, 830 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) oF TORTS § 552 (1958)).
141. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 127, § 107, at 745 (footnotes omitted).
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ker is relating material information about the property, he should
have a reasonable belief that the information is sound. The
seller, because of his interest in having the property sold at the
highest possible price, may not be the best source of correct information. Quite possibly, the broker may decide that a routine
inspection of each property he lists is a necessary, if not legally
42
required, function in his day-to-day business activities.1'
The courts that have decided cases in the area of negligent
misrepresentation in regard to a broker's statement concerning
real property have reached a wide variety of conclusions. Some
have held a broker liable for repeating a statement made by the
seller only if the broker knew or should have known that the statement was false. 143 Some courts have found that though the broker owes no duty to furnish information to the buyer, once the
broker undertakes to do so, he must do so accurately. 4 4 Other
courts have gone beyond the traditional negligent misrepresentation analysis and found liability for "innocent" misrepresentations. Accordingly, these courts hold that "a purchaser who relies
on a material misrepresentation, even though innocently made,
has a cause of action against the broker originating or communicating the misrepresentation."'

' 45

These cases run the gamut of possible liability for misrepresentation-from intentional fraud to arguably strict liability.'

46

The common thread running through all these cases is the need
to balance the damage done to the buyer as a result of the misrepresentation with the relative culpability of the broker. As Prosser
and Keeton stated:
142. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
143. Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 I11. App. 3d 257, 259, 389
N.E.2d 623, 625 (1979) ("[A] realtor has no duty to prospective purchasers to
independently substantiate the representation of a disclosed seller unless he is
aware of facts which tend to indicate that such representation is false.").
144. Lawlor v. Scheper, 232 S.C. 94, 99, 101 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1957) (no
evidence to indicate that false information was furnished by seller, however,
court found "appellants owed no duty to furnish any information... but when
they undertook to do so, they owed a duty not to mislead respondent").
145. Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982) (broker represented to
buyers that well on property was "good well" when in fact it was not adequate;
court found broker to have made misrepresentation by not investigating); see
infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
146. See Fossey & Roston, The Broker's Liability in a Real Estate Transaction.
Bad News and Good News for Defense Attornieys, 12 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 37
(1982), (authors argue that Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982),
adopts rule of strict liability for any misrepresentations that broker makes or
communicates to buyer) [hereinafter Fossey & Roston, The Broker's Liability in a
Real Estate Transaction].
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No doubt virtually all courts today would recognize the
existence of some situations where the nature of a representer's activity or a pre-existing relationship between
the representer and the representee or the two factors
together will constitute the basis for the imposition of a
duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid harm from reasonable and expectable reliance on what is said at least
about certain matters related to the subject matter of the
transaction. 147
The question becomes where should a court draw the line in regard to the broker's duty to the buyer. Certainly the broker has a
duty not to make statements to the buyer which he knows are
false. However, once the courts hold that the broker will also be
liable for statements which he should have known are false, the
problem becomes one of determining what information the broker should know. This raises, once again, questions as to the broker's proper role in the real estate transaction-whether he is
merely a conduit between seller and buyer or a professional who
has a duty to treat both parties fairly and equitably.
The courts apply a wide variety of tests and standards in determining what the broker reasonably should have known concerning the property. At one end of the spectrum is the Supreme
Court of Vermont in Provost v. Miller,' 48 which held that:
[a]s an agent of a seller, a real estate broker or agent is
guilty of negligent misrepresentation only if he or she
passes information from a seller to a buyer that he or she
knows or has reason to know may be untrue. Real estate
brokers and agents are marketing agents, not structural
engineers or contractors. They have no duty to verify
independently representations made by a seller unless
they are aware of facts that [seem to indicate that the
49
representation is false].'
This sentiment is closely echoed by the Illinois Appellate Court in
Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church,150 which stated:
It is our belief that a realtor has no duty to prospective
purchasers to independently substantiate the representa147. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 127, § 107, at 746.
148. 149 Vt. 67, 473 A.2d 1163 (1984).
149. Id. at 69-70, 473 A.2d at 1163-64 (citations omitted).
150. 71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 389 N.E.2d 623 (1979).
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tion of a disclosed seller unless he is aware of facts which
tend to indicate that such representation is false .... Of
course, even if such a duty is invoked, there is no breach
unless the realtor could have discovered the falsity of the
51
representation by exercise of reasonable care.'
Under the holdings of Provost and Lyons the broker, as long as
he is aware of no information that would lead him to believe that
the seller's representations are false, can relay that information to
the buyer without fear of liability. Both cases rely on comment b
of section 348 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which states:
An agent is not liable because of misrepresentations
of the principal or of another agent unless he knows or
should know of them. He is not affected by the knowledge of facts [that] the principal or another agent has
and which, if known to him, would cause his representations to be fraudulent. An agent who makes untrue
statements based upon the information given to him by
the principal is not liable because of the fact that the
principal knew the information to be untrue. An agent
can properly rely upon statements of the principal to the
same extent as upon statements from any other reputa52
ble source. 1
c.

Innocent v. Negligent Misrepresentation

In the Lyons and Provost cases the broker's duty to investigate
the seller's representations concerning the property arises only if
153
the broker should have known that the statements were false.
However, other cases interpret the broker's duty to investigate
the truth or falsity of the seller's statements concerning the property much more broadly: the broker has been held liable for an
"innocent" misrepresentation.1 54 These cases hold the broker li151. Id. at 259-60, 389 N.E.2d at 625.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 comment b (1958) (cited in
Provost, 144 Vt. at 68, 473 A.2d at 1163, and Lyons, 71 111. App. 3d at 260, 389
N.E.2d at 625).
153. The misrepresentation that was the basis of the lawsuit in Lyons involved a statement by the broker that the home was connected to the city sewage
system when in fact it was not. Lyons, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 258-59, 389 N.E.2d at
624. The Provost case involved the failure of the broker to inform the buyer of a
structural defect in the home that caused the collapse of a basement wall.
Provost, 144 Vt. at 68, 473 A.2d at 1163.
154. The tort of innocent misrepresentation is defined in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552C(l) (1977):
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able for communicating or originating a material misrepresentation to the buyer even though the misrepresentation was
innocently made. 15 5 Other cases interpret the broker's duty to
investigate more broadly than do the courts in Lyons and Provost,
yet do not reach the strict liability standard that innocent misrep56
resentation liability implies.'
Clearly, the broker, as a professional, must be more than a
conduit of information between the seller and the buyer. Yet,
should the broker be an absolute guarantor of the truth of the
information that the buyer receives? A position which is midway
between the two extremes is preferable. The broker would be
liable to the buyer for misrepresentation if he failed to exercise
reasonable care in the obtaining or communicating of the information. Reasonable care would involve a duty to investigate to
determine the truth or falsity of information supplied by the seller
and, in some instances, a duty to conduct an independent investigation of the property to determine its true condition. This standard of liability is set out in section 552 of the Restatement (Second)

of Torts:
One who, in the course of his business, profession
or employment or in any other transaction in which he
has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
1 57
or communicating the information.
Although few cases involving real estate broker liability to the
buyer of real property for misrepresentation have been expressly
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another,
makes a misrepresentation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
it is not made fraudulently or negligently.
Id.
155. See Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982) ("[W]e hold
that a purchaser who relies on a material misrepresentation, even though innocently made, has a cause of action against the broker originating or communicating the misrepresentation.").
156. See Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 615 P.2d 1305 (1980)
(broker must confirm or refute information from seller which broker knows is
important to buyer).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
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based on section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 158 several
have used the same underlying principles in evaluating the broker's liability. In the 1957 case of Lawlor v. Scheper,1 519 the
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the brokers:
owed no duty to furnish any information . . .but when

they undertook to do so, they owed a duty not to mislead
[the buyer]. They may not have known that the representation was false but as to liability for actual damages,
the effect is the same where, as here they professed to
160
have knowledge of the facts stated.
The court in Lawlor is basically using a reasonable care standard
as the basis of liability. The broker, by representing that he has
knowledge, must use reasonable care to make certain that the information is truthful.
16
In 1970 the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Berryman, '
held that the broker should have known that the property had a
water problem and thus made a false representation to the buyer
which induced the buyer to purchase the property. 162 The court
found that it was not necessary to prove that the broker acted with
an intent to deceive, nor that he knew that the information was
false.1 63 The court stated that "[t]he right of recovery.., is based
on the fact that such statement, being untrue in fact, relied upon
by the other party in entering into the transaction, has resulted in
the loss to him which he should not be required to bear."' 164 The
court reasoned that because the broker knew that the buyers
would not consider purchasing a home with a water seepage
problem and that the broker could have discovered the seepage
problem, the fact that the broker did not actually know of the
158. See Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc., 101 N.M.
572, 686 P.2d 262 (1984) (listing broker may be liable for negligent failure to
discover and disclose defects, if, in exercise of reasonable care, he should have

had actual knowledge of defects).
159. 232 S.C. 94, 101 S.E.2d 269 (1957).
160. Id. at 99-100, 101 S.E.2d at 271. Law/or involved a misrepresentation
by the broker as to the amount owing on two mortgages covering the property.
Id. at 98, 101 S.E.2d at 270. The seller, apparently, had no knowledge of the
misrepresentation and did not authorize it. Id.
161. 286 Minn. 270, 175 N.W.2d 438 (1970).
162. Id. at 276, 175 N.W.2d at 442.
163. Id. at 275, 175 N.W.2d at 442.
164. Id. at 276, 175 N.W.2d at 442 (quoting Swanson v. Domning, 251
Minn. 110, 115, 86 N.W.2d 716, 720 (1957)).
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water problem would not insulate him from liability.16 5 The Berryman court, however, is not adopting a strict liability standard
for broker misrepresentations. The court clearly states that in order to be the basis of a fraud cause of action the false representa66
tion must be "susceptible of knowledge" by the defendant.
Thus, the court seems to be pointing toward the use of reasonable care by the broker in his statements to the buyer-particularly if the broker is aware that the buyer considers the
information of material importance. This duty to the buyer may,
in fact, involve investigating not only the information concerning
the property which the seller has related but also information

which the seller may not have disclosed and yet is of primary importance to the buyer.
In 1980 the Washington State Court of Appeals, in Tennant v.
Lawton, 16 7 held that a real estate broker "is required to employ a
reasonable degree of effort and professional expertise to confirm
or refute information from the seller which he knows, or should
know, is pivotal to the transaction from the buyer's perspective."' 1 6 8 The court recognized that despite the fact that the broker owed a fiduciary duty to the seller, he, as a professional, was
in a position to verify the information that the seller related to
him.' 6 9 The broker had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect
the buyer from false information.17 0 Once again, a court is using
the negligence-based standard of reasonable care to establish the
1 7
broker's duty to the buyer. '
Thus, even though the broker and the buyer are not in an
165. Id. The court suggests that an experienced broker who knows his merchandise would be able to discover the water seepage problem. Id.
166. Id. at 275, 175 N.W.2d at 439. The court states:
The rule governing recovery on the basis of fraud requires the
plaintiff to show that defendant made a false representation of a past or
existing material fact, susceptible of knowledge, knowing it to be false or
without knowing whether it was true or false, with the intention of inducing the person to whom it was made to act in reliance upon it or
under such circumstances that such person was justified in so acting
and was thereby deceived or induced to so act to his damage.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
167. 26 Wash. App. 701, 615 P.2d 1305 (1980).
168. Id. at 706, 615 P.2d at 1310. Tennant involved an unintentional misrepresentation by the broker that a septic tank approval permit had been issued
on the lot. Id. at 703, 615 P.2d at 1308. The court found "that the 'agent was
truly justifiably ignorant of the element of falsity in the representation.' " Id.
169. Id. at 706, 615 P.2d at 1309.
170. Id.
171. Id. The court in Tennant recognizes that liability is grounded in negligence. The court stated: "The correct rule is that the broker is liable because of
material misrepresentations of the principal if he repeats them and knows, or
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agency relationship, the broker must take affirmative steps to
avoid disseminating false information to the buyer. This duty
clearly mandates that the broker's role in the transaction is more
than that of a conduit of information between the seller and the
buyer. The broker is an active participant in the transaction who
has duties to both parties. His ultimate loyalty must lie with his
principal, the seller, but he cannot ignore the right of the buyer to
truthful information concerning the property. This duty to the
buyer, in many situations, could involve an actual investigation by
the broker to determine the truth or falsity of the seller's information concerning the property and could also involve an investigation to discover defects that have not been disclosed.
Yet the broker's role in the real estate transaction is not one
of an omniscient being. He cannot be reasonably expected to
know everything that concerns real property and certainly cannot
be held liable for every misrepresentation. His duty to the buyer
should be limited to only those false representations of which he
knows or reasonably should know. This limitation, however,
should not significantly restrict the broker's duty to the buyer.
The broker would have a duty to disclose material information
concerning the property which through the exercise of reasonable
care the broker could discover. In other words, the broker would
be liable for a misrepresentation concerning the property if he
negligently makes a misrepresentation or negligently fails to discover the defect in the property. As Prosser and Keeton state:
While the courts have justifiably been somewhat more
conservative in the protection of intangible economic
and business interests than they have with respect to interests in freedom from physical damage to things and
persons, there would seem to be very little justification
for not extending liability to all parties and agents to a
bargaining transaction for making misrepresentations
72
negligently. 1
The broker, as a professional, should be required to meet a reasonable care standard; however, the broker should not be strictly
liable for any false representation made to the buyer.
reasonably should know, of their falsity.... Liability attaches in this context oil
grounds of negligence." Id. (citations omitted).
172. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 127, § 107, at 745. Prosser and Keeton
point out that only a few jurisdictions have adopted this position; the majority
have gone to a further extreme and made the representee strictly liable for the
misrepresentation. Id at 745-46.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 1

976

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32: p. 939

One of the earliest cases to arguably adopt a strict liability
standard is Spargnapani v. Wright,1 73 a municipal court of appeals
decision for the District of Columbia. In Spargnapani, the broker
was held liable for misrepresenting to the buyer that the heating
system in the home was in good condition when, in fact, the crack
in the boiler had been "doped" with a sealing preparation and the
crack concealed with a patch and paintjob. 174 The camouflage of
the boiler had been carried out by a seller of the property and the
17 5
broker had no knowledge of any defect in the heating system.
The court held that "[i]f the broker innocently represented the
heating plant was in workable condition and was mistaken in that
representation without knowledge whether it was true or false,
the injured party may recover in an action for fraud."' 76 The
Spargnapanicourt did not discuss the broker's duty to investigate
in order to discover the boiler defect; the court merely found that
since the broker represented that the house could be heated for
"a little over a hundred dollars" when in fact the house could not
be heated at all because of the defect in the heating system, the
broker was liable for the defect.' 7 7 The court did not discuss
whether or not the broker should have known about the defective
heater, but rather focused on the fact that the broker maintained
a pretense of knowledge and that was a fraud.' 78 At least arguably the Spargnapani court adopted a strict liability standard with
regard to broker liability to the buyer for misrepresentations
made concerning the property.
In 1982 the Supreme Court of Alaska, in Bevins v. Ballard, 7I
held that a broker who falsely represented the condition of a well
on the real property was liable to the buyers even though the mis173. 110 A.2d 82 (D.C. 1954).
174. Id. at 89.
175. Id. at 83.
176. Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 84. The court stated:
[T]he broker displayed a "pretense of knowledge," conveyed to plaintiffs in the form of a representation, that if they bought the house they
would be getting a functioning heating plant. Innocent though the pretended knowledge may have been, it was in fact baseless. The law does
not, in such a situation, withhold its aid from one who has been led into
a contract to his detriment.
Id.
178. Id. at 85 ("This pretense of knowledge on the part of the seller's
agent, this vital though innocent misrepresentation, being in the eyes of the law
a fraud, left no room for the application of caveat emptor.").
179. 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982).
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representation was innocently made.180 The court in Bevins based
its holding on the fact that the potential of broker liability "would
tend to lessen the likelihood of transactions tainted by misinformation and confusion."' 8' The court also recognized that by allowing a cause of action against the broker, the buyer will have
another source of recovery, and "[a]s between the broker who
communicated the misrepresentation, and the purchaser whose
only fault was to rely on the broker, we think it preferable that the
broker bear any loss caused by misrepresentation."''8 2 The court
pointed out that the broker could protect himself by investigating
the information given to him by the seller, or by disclaiming
knowledge, or by requiring the seller to give written representations concerning the property and agree to indemnify the broker
18 3
if the representations are false.
As the dissent in Bevins argues, the allowance of an innocent
misrepresentation cause of action against the broker is almost
tantamount to imposing strict liability.'8 4 One commentator
states "under Bevins a broker may incur liability even where he has
used due diligence in checking the accuracy of his information,
but for some reason was mistaken."' 8 5 Unfortunately, the Bevins
court expressly based its holding on the grounds of innocent misrepresentation instead of negligent misrepresentation. Arguably
the broker would have been liable to the purchasers under the
tort of negligent misrepresentation; 8 6 the court noted that in order to determine whether the broker breached his duty to the
buyer, the following criteria must be considered:
(a) whether the defendant had knowledge, or its
equivalent, that the information was desired for a serious
purpose and that the plaintiff intended to rely upon it;
180. Id. at 763 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(l) (1977)).
For the text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
181. Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 764 (Conner, J., dissenting). The dissent states that there is "no
reason to make the broker the guarantor of representations emanating from the
seller." Id.; see Fossey & Roston, The Brokers" Liability in a Real Estate Transaction.
supra note 146, at 40.
185. Fossey & Roston, The Brokers LiabilitY ini a Real Estale Transactio). snpra

note 146, at 39.
186. "Under this theory [negligent misrepresentation], Bevins, [the broker]
could have been liable for breaching his duty to provide accurate information
once he undertook to speak." Bevins, 655 P.2d at 760.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987

39

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 1

978

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32: p. 939

(b) the foreseeability of harm; (c) the degree of certainty
that plaintiff would suffer harm; (d) the directness of causation; and (e) the policy of preventing future harm. In
the land sales context, such a duty can arise when a broker becomes aware of suspicious facts regarding his or
her representations, or when a buyer makes an affirmative inquiry and the broker fails to check the accuracy of
his subsequent responding representation, or when a
court determines that public policy requires brokers to
87
undertake certain functions.
However, the trial court's dismissal of the negligence claim
against the broker precluded the court from basing broker liability on the negligent misrepresentation theory. 18 8 Thus, the court,
because the broker clearly did not make an intentional misrepresentation, based liability on the innocent misrepresentation
theory. 189
In Guaerke v. Rozga,' 90 the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly based a broker's liability to the buyer for a misrepresentation on strict liability.' 9 ' In Guaerke, the court held a real estate
broker strictly liable for misrepresentations regarding acreage
and road frontage of the property. 19 2 The broker was held
strictly liable for not only those facts that he could be expected to
know without an investigation, but also any facts which a broker
could be expected to know.' 93 At the trial, the buyers sued on
both a negligent misrepresentation theory and a strict liability
theory; however, the jury was instructed that if they found the
broker strictly liable they did not need to answer the negligence
questions. They found strict liability and the verdict was upheld
187. Id. at 760-61 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 761.
189. Id.
190. 112 Wis. 2d 271, 332 N.W.2d 804 (1983).
191. Id. at 277-80, 332 N.W.2d at 807-09 (1983).
192. Id. at 273-76, 332 N.W.2d at 811-12.
193. Id. at 280, 332 N.W.2d at 809. The court stated: " 'Strict responsibility applies in those circumstances which indicate that the speaker either had particular means of ascertaining the pertinent facts, or his position made possible
complete knowledge and the statements fairly implied that he had it. Therefore
the speaker ought to have known or else ought not to have spoken.' " Id. (quoting Notes For Trial Judge Wis. J. I. No. 2400, Misrepresentation: Basis For Liability and Damages (quoting Stevenson v. Barniweck, 8 Wis. 2d 557, 99 N.W.2d
690 (1959))). Id. The acreage figures that the broker communicated to the
buyer were based on information received from the sellers, but which the broker
had not verified. Id. at 273, 332 N.W.2d at 805. However, the sellers signed a
warranty that the figures were correct. Id. at 273, 332 N.W.2d at 805-06.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss5/1

40

Murray: The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to

1987]

REAL ESTATE BROKER AND BUYER

979

on appeal. 19 4 The court in Guaerke found that strict liability was
merited in this case because public policy mandated that the loss
be placed on the innocent defendant rather than the innocent
plaintiff.' 9 5 Strict liability applied in situations in which the
speaker could ascertain the particular facts and his statements im19 6
plied that he had knowledge of those facts.
As in Bevins, the broker arguably could have been liable on a
negligent misrepresentation theory, yet the court opted to expand the broker's potential liability. Both Gauerke and Bevins extend the broker's duty to the buyer beyond all reasonable
proportion. The broker should not be made to guarantee absolutely to the buyer that the proper is free from all defects. He
should only be liable for those defects which in the exercise of
reasonable care or competence he knows or should know.
Thereby, the buyer would be protected from a "head in the sand"
approach by the broker, yet the broker would be protected by limiting his potential liability to only those misrepresentations which
he as a real estate professional should know are false.
d.

Negligence

Real estate brokers have been sued not only for breach of
fiduciary duty to the buyer and misrepresentations made to the
buyer, but also for simple negligence which led to the buyer's injury. The leading negligence case is the California Court of Appeals case of Easton v. Strassburger.'9 7 The court in Easton points
out that to maintain a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff
would not have to prove that the broker had actual knowledge of
the defect or that the broker made a misrepresentation. As the
court states: "[w]e are concerned here only with the elements of
a simple negligence action; that is, whether appellant owed a legal
duty to respondent to use due care, whether this legal duty was
194. Id. at 275, 332 N.W.2d at 806.
195. Id. at 280, 332 N.W.2d at 808-09.
196. Id. at 280-81, 332 N.W.2d at 809. The court also states:
[T]he applicability of the doctrine of strict responsibility does not de-

pend upon the actual source of the speaker's knowledge; rather, this
element is satisfied if the speaker professes or implies personal knowledge. The other key element is the buyer's justifiable reliance on the
statement. If the fact represented is something that one would not expect the speaker to know without an investigation, this might be a fac-

tor in determining whether there was justifiable reliance on the part of
the buyer.
Id.
197. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
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breached, and finally whether the breach was a proximate cause
of appellant's injury."' 19 8 The Easton case involved the purchase,
of a home by the buyers which was built on a landfill that had
been improperly compacted causing land slides and foundation
cracks. ' 9 9 The sellers knew of the slides and foundation problems
and had taken corrective action yet failed to disclose this to the
brokers. 20 0 The jury found all the named defendants negligent,
including the broker, the sellers, and the builder, and assessed
damages at $197,000.201 The negligence was apportioned on the
basis of comparative negligence and the broker was found to be
20 2
5% negligent.
The court analyzed the broker's duty to the buyer and found
that the broker's duty to the buyer includes a duty to disclose that
which should be known, and a duty to conduct a reasonable inspection to discover the information that reasonably should be
known. 20 3 The court then quoted a provision of the National Association of Realtors Code of Ethics and determined that the broker as a professional must possess certain knowledge about the
property he is selling and that the broker has an "affirmative duty
to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the
residential property listed for sale and to disclose to prospective
purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of
' 20 4
the property that such an investigation would reveal.
The facts of the Easton case reveal that the broker was aware
of certain "red flags" which indicated an erosion or settlement
problem, and yet did not request that any soil testing be undertaken.2 0 5 The California court is clearly requiring that the broker
198. Id. at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
200. Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
201. Id. at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. The court states:
Definition of the broker's duty to disclose as necessarily including the
responsibility to conduct a reasonable investigation thus seems to us
warranted by the pertinent realities. Not only do many buyers in fact
justifiablV believe the seller's broker is also protecting their interest in
securing and acting upon accurate information and rely upon him, but
the injury occasioned by such reliance, if it be misplaced, may well be
substantial .... It seems relevant to us, in this regard, that the duty to
disclose that which should be known is a formally acknowledged professional obligation that it appears many brokers customarily impose upon
themselves as an ethical matter.
Id. (footnote omitted).
204. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
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undertake a reasonable inspection of the- property whenever the
broker is alerted or should be alerted to potential problems that
may materially affect the value or desirability of the property.
The broker then has a duty to disclose his findings to the potential buyer. While the duty to inspect required by Easton has met
with criticism among some commentators, 20 6 the standard imposed on brokers in Easton is not much, if any, more rigorous
than the standards imposed on the broker for innocent or negligent misrepresentation. 20 7 Easton merely confirms the duty the
broker, as a professional, owes to a third party, the buyer, in the
exercise of his professional duties. The real estate industry has
expressed shock and surprise at the imposition of a duty to the
buyer by the Easton court; however, every professional has a duty
to protect third parties from an unreasonable risk of harm. The
real estate broker as a professional must accept some responsibility for third parties who are affected by his professional
20 8
conduct.
The broker is not required to seek out and find every conceivable defect of the property and disclose all to the buyer-only
those which are "reasonably discoverable." 20 9 The broker is further protected by the principles of comparative negligence-the
206. See Comment,JudicialImposition of A Duty to Inspect, supra note 50, at 836
("[T]he broker may be held liable, despite a diligent inspection of the property,
if he overlooks a defect which the jury in hindsight believes should have been
discovered. The broker is not merely 'insuring' the seller's representation.
Rather, he is insuring, for the purchaser's benefit, that the property will be free
from defects."); Comment, Real Estate Brokers Liability for Failureto Disclose, supra
note 3, at 339-45; see also Comment, Mandatory Disclosure: The Key to Residential
Real Estate Brokers' Conflicting Obligations, 19J. MAR. L. REV. 201 (1985). But see
Comment, Expansion of a Real Estate Broker's Duties: Is Easton v. Strassburger in
Illinois' Future?, supra note 88, at 120 ("Adoption of Easton in Illinois would not
unduly burden a competent broker because one becomes competent by acquiring knowledge of the attributes and defects of subject property.").
207. For a discussion of the standard, see supra notes 142-79 and accompanying text.
208. See Professional Duty of Real Estate Brokers to Buyers, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 25,
1985, at 15, col. 3.
While the real estate industry has registered surprise at this imposition of responsibilities that were not based on the licensee's agency or
duties to the principal, actually this case is nothing more than an expression of the general principle that every professional, including a
real estate licensee, owes a duty to act reasonably and in such a manner
that an unreasonable risk of harm is not caused to any person within
the area of foreseeable risk.
Id.; see also Note, Imposing Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokes Selling Defective Housing, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1862 (1986) (real estate transactions will be more economically efficient if brokers are legally required to inspect and disclose reasonably
discoverable defects to buyer).
209. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 1

982

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32: p. 939

buyer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect himself.
The buyer has a duty to discover defects which are clearly apparent from an inspection of the property. 21 0 The broker will not be
required to conduct an extensive investigation of the property in
order to satisfy his duty to the buyer. He must simply use his
expertise and professional knowledge to discover as much information about the product he is selling as he reasonably can. He
must then disclose the information he has learned to the potential
buyer and the buyer can choose whether or not to conduct a more
2
extensive investigation. '
Many other professionals, including notaries, attorneys, accountants, architects, engineers, and surveyors, may be liable to
third parties for negligent conduct. 212 Easton merely extended
this liability to the real estate broker as a professional. The exact
parameters of a real estate broker's duty to the buyer have yet to
be determined; however, because of the real estate broker's vital
role in a residential transaction the duty should be broadly defined. Certainly the broker must, at a minimum, verify all information that the seller gives to him, including all information to be
put into the multiple listing system. 2 13 The broker should, as a
matter of course, inspect every property he lists and note any potential "red flags" of trouble. The broker should then disclose
his findings to both the buyer and seller, and notify the buyer in
writing that these potential problem areas should be further investigated by an expert in the appropriate field. If the buyer
chooses not to follow up with an inspection, then the broker has
discharged his duty and has potentially saved himself and the
seller the cost of defending a misrepresentation or negligence law
suit.
210. Id. ("[C]ases will undoubtedly arise in which the defect in the property
is so clearly apparent that as a matter of law a broker would not be negligent for
failure to expressly disclose it, as he could reasonably expect that the buyer's
own inspection of the premises would reveal the flaw, In such a case the buyer's
negligence alone would be the proximate cause of any injury he suffered.").
211. The broker in Easton would have probably discharged his duty to the
buyer if he had merely alerted the buyer to the possible problems indicated by
the "red flags." The buyer would have been placed on notice of the possible
problems and could have hired an engineer to make a thorough inspection of
the property.
212. Professional Duty of Real Estate Brokers to Buyers, supra note 208, at 15, col.
3; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 127, § 107, at 747.
213. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1088 provides: "If an agent places a listing in the
Multiple Listing Service. . .that agent shall be responsible for the truth of all
representations and statements in the listing of which that agent had knowledge,
or reasonably should have had knowledge, to anyone injured by their falseness or
inaccuracy.;' CAL. CIv. CODE § 1088 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
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Easton is not the pariah that many in the real estate industry
would like to believe. The competent broker already routinely
conducts an inspection of the property and alerts potential purchasers of any "red flags" that the broker finds. This investigation benefits the broker by increasing his knowledge about the
strengths and weaknesses of the property, thus increasing his professional competence. The buyer is benefited by acquiring the
maximum amount of information about the property before making the decision to purchase the property, thus making a more
informed choice. 2 14 Easton is merely a judicial recognition and
definition of the legal duty the broker owes to the buyer. In 1985
the California legislature passed two statutes in direct response to
Easton. California Civil Code Sections 2079, 2079.1-.5 further defines the legal duty set forth in Easton;2 15 and California Civil
Code Sections 1102, 1102.1-.14 specifies the type of disclosure
that must be made to a potential purchaser. 2 16 This legislative
response to the growing liability of real estate brokers is much
needed. The adoption of the mandatory disclosure form should
give the California broker guidance concerning the nature and
extent of the disclosures required. 2 17 The standard of conduct is
not onerous and the competent broker is most likely operating
under this standard without actually being aware of it. Clearly in
214. Comment, Expansion of a Real Estate Broker's Duties, supra note 88, at 120
("Adoption of Easton... would not unduly burden a competent broker because
one becomes competent by acquiring knowledge of the attributes and defects of
subject property. Moreover, conducting a reasonable investigation is an ethical
obligation imposed on brokers by their own professional organization. On the
other hand, the purchasers are benefited in that they are making well-informed
decisions concerning a major investment.").
215. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2079, 2079.1-.5 (West Supp. 1988). Section 2079
provides:
It is the duty of a real estate broker, licensed under [California
law], to a prospective purchaser of residential real property. . ., to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose to the prospective purchaser all
facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that
such an investigation would reveal, if that broker has a written contract
with the seller to find or obtain a buyer or is a broker who acts in cooperation with such a broker to find and obtain a buyer.
Id. § 2079.
216. Id. §§ 1102, 1102.1-.14. Section 1102.6 contains a mandatory four
part disclosure form with which all prospective purchasers must be provided. Id.
§ 1102.6.
217. See Fink, A Legislative Response to Easton v. Strassburger, 4 CAL. R. PROP.
J. 18 (1986) (extensive discussion of the California legislation). But see King,
Broker Liability after Easton v. Strassburger: Let the Buyer Be Aware, 25 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 651 (1985) (California legislation shifts burden of inspection back
onto home purchaser).
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the interest of dealing honestly and ethically with the buyer, the
21 8
duty to investigate is warranted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Without a doubt, the real estate broker owes some sort of
legal duty to the buyer in a residential real estate transaction.
The courts have interpreted this duty as to encompass everything
from a fiduciary relationship to strict liability. The real estate industry, as well as the general public, is understandably confused
as to what actually is the proper relationship between the broker
and the buyer. In recent years there has been a general trend
toward imposing a standard of good faith and fair dealing in
many types of transactions, and this standard should also be applied to the dealings of the broker and the buyer. However, a
fiduciary duty should not be imposed on the broker and buyer.
The broker is already in a fiduciary relationship with the seller,
and the legal imposition of a fiduciary relationship with the buyer
will put the broker in an impossible situation-he cannot act in
the best interest of both parties. To try and do so is to invite a
law suit by one or both parties.
Yet the broker cannot simply represent the seller and ignore
the buyer. In the modern residential real estate transaction, the
selling broker in a MLS transaction will spend many hours with
the buyer. The buyer will come to depend and rely on the broker
for his professional expertise. The broker will be a vital source of
information concerning the property. This information should be
correct and the broker should recognize a duty to the buyer to
use reasonable care to make certain that the information is accurate. If the broker fails to use reasonable care in the obtaining or
communicating of the information, then the buyer should have a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against the
broker.
The broker's duty to the buyer must not be interpreted as a
strict liability standard. The broker cannot guarantee to the
buyer that the property is free from all defects. Nevertheless, the
broker, in the exercise of reasonable care, must utilize all his pro218. "Brokers, even if not legally required to provide buyers with information about a property, may sometimes disclose defects because of the mandates
of a professional responsibility code or concern for their market position; [footnote omitted] nevertheless, legal requirements are desirable, because these
other considerations often provide inadequate monetary incentives to induce
brokers to take the proper amount of care." Note, Imposing Tort Liability on Real

Estate Brokers Selling Defective Housing, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1871 (1986).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss5/1

46

Murray: The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to
19871

REAL ESTATE BROKER AND BUYER

985

fessional expertise to discover the material defects of the property. Thus, the broker cannot merely rely on the information
concerning the property provided by the seller, but must undertake an independent investigation of the property. This investigation should be conducted as a routine part of the listing process.
The broker must verify all information given to him by the seller,
and, in addition, must conduct an independent inspection of the
property to discover any information which might materially affect the value of the property.
The imposition of the duty to investigate upon the broker
will benefit all parties to the transaction. Today, many buyers
wrongly but understandably believe that the broker is acting in
their best interest. They are many times disappointed in the broker's conduct in the transaction. By the time that the broker has
explained the nature of his fiduciary duty with the seller, it is too
late to avoid a law suit. The rash of suits against brokers and sellers for fraud, negligent or innocent misrepresentation, and simple negligence is an indication as to how severe this problem
really is. Yet, many of these suits could be avoided if the broker
would do two things-inform the buyer in writing at the beginning of their relationship that the broker is in a fiduciary relationship with the seller, and conduct an investigation of the property
to discover all material defects and disclose any material defects
to the buyer. If the broker would routinely follow these two relatively simple steps, he would, in many cases, forestall legal action
by the buyer.
The Easton case and the corresponding California legislature's imposition of a duty to investigate should not be viewed as
another potential legal headache for the broker, but as a turning
point in broker liability. Brokers now know what their duty is to
the buyer-to use reasonable care to avoid misleading the buyer.
This is not an unconscionable standard, but one which ethical and
honest brokers should readily embrace. It avoids the dual agency
problem, but allows for fair treatment of the buyer. The real estate industry must recognize that as professionals they are going
to be held to a high standard of care and instead of fighting the
imposition of this standard, they should utilize it to create a more
honest and ethical business environment for both the seller and
the buyer.
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